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“The	 Environmental	 Emergency”2	argued	 that	 environmental	 issues	 confront	 lawmakers	 as	 an	
ongoing	emergency.	The	complexity	of	environmental	 issues	and	the	possibility	of	catastrophe	
mean	that	it	is	not	always	possible	for	lawmakers	to	foresee	an	environmental	catastrophe	or	to	
know	 in	 advance	 how	 to	 appropriately	 respond.	 The	 implication	 of	 the	 environmental	








rights.3	As	 such,	 libertarians	 are	 opposed	 to	 the	 delegation	 of	 extensive	 discretion	 to	 the	
executive	branch	of	the	state.	For	example,	Richard	Epstein	writes,	“the	cumulative	demands	of	
the	 modern	 social	 democratic	 state	 require	 a	 range	 of	 administrative	 compromises	 and	
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theory.”4	In	 Epstein’s	 view,	 the	 ambitions	 of	 “the	 modern	 social	 democratic	 state,”	 which	
include	 environmental	 protection	 and	 land	use	management,	 inevitably	 succumb	 to,	 amongst	
other	things,	biased	decision-making,	retroactive	laws	and	misplaced	judicial	foci	as	government	
attempts	 to	 respond	 to	mounting	 social	 challenges.5	The	 libertarian	 position	 poses	 a	 serious,	





Environmental	 Emergency.”	 Unfortunately,	 his	 critique	 represents	 a	 regrettably	 missed	
opportunity	for	the	Osgoode	Hall	Law	Journal	to	be	a	site	of	serious	academic	exchange.	Indeed,	
Pardy’s	 response	 impedes	 such	 an	 exchange	 through	 a	 gross	 mischaracterization	 of	 my	
argument.	For	example,	I	am	said	to	argue	“that	the	state	of	the	natural	world	is	 incompatible	
with	 the	 rule	 of	 law.”7	I	 am	 accused	 of	 arguing	 for	 the	 nonsensical	 view	 that	 “unconstrained	
executive	 discretion	 is	 legitimate	 because	 it	 is	 constrained.”8	His	 response	 to	 my	 article	 is	
dismissive	 and	 condescending.	 In	 his	 view,	 I	 have	 “lost	 the	 will	 to	 abstract”9	and	 I	 “wildly	
extrapolate	[from	the	challenges	posed	by	the	ambiguity	of	language]	to	abandon	the	enterprise	
of	 expressing	 rules	 and	 reasons	 that	 limit	 the	 power	 of	 those	 who	 govern.”10	He	 calls	 my	
argument	“a	cop	out”11	and	“a	process	of	doublethink	that	would	make	George	Orwell	 spin	 in	
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I	was	surprised	by	the	level	of	vitriol	and	insult	in	Pardy’s	response.	It	was	all	the	more	surprising	










state,	 environmental	 libertarianism	does	not	 supply	 a	 theory	of	 law	 that	 adequately	 accounts	
for	the	possibility	of	catastrophe.	Conversely,	if	one	accepts	that	emergencies	can	be	governed	
by	a	 substantive	conception	of	 the	 rule	of	 law,	as	Pardy	seems	 to	do,	 then	 the	administrative	
state	 can	 also	 be	 governed	 by	 a	 substantive	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Part	 I,	 in	 short,	











public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Part	 III	 accomplishes	 this	 task	 by	 taking	 up	
Pardy’s	 objection	 that	 the	 existing	 state	 of	 Canadian	 environmental	 law	 undermines	 the	
aspirational	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 that	 I	 defend.	 It	 argues	 that	 a	 commitment	 to	 this	
conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 has	 considerable	 potential	 to	 secure	 greater	 environmental	
protection	 by	 subjecting	 all	 public	 decision-makers	 to	 the	 obligation	 to	 publicly	 justify	 their	
	 4	





This	part	 reclaims	 the	environmental	emergency	 from	Pardy’s	confounding	characterization	of	
the	original	argument.	A	central	objective	of	“The	Environmental	Emergency	and	the	Legality	of	
Discretion	 in	 Environmental	 Law”	 was	 to	 draw	 out	 the	 implicit	 rule-of-law	 assumptions	 in	









emergency	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 theorizing	 about	 the	 rule	 of	 law.16	Environmental	 issues	 share	
the	epistemic	features	of	an	emergency.	We	cannot	reliably	predict	which	environmental	issues	
contain	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 catastrophe	 or	 know	 in	 advance	 how	 to	 respond.	 It	 is	 not	 that	
ecosystems	 are	 in	 a	 perpetual	 state	 of	 emergency,	 as	 Pardy	 suggests. 17 	Rather,	 their	
unpredictable	 nature	 confronts	 human	 decision-makers	 as	 an	 emergency	when	we	 are	 faced	
with	 an	 unexpected	 catastrophe	 that	 demands	 an	 immediate	 response.18	Moreover,	 because	
some	 catastrophes	 are	 unknowable	 in	 advance,	 we	 cannot	 always	 distinguish	 specific	
environmental	 issues	and	 subject	 them	 to	 special	 rule-of-law	 requirements.	All	 environmental	
issues	are	 therefore	 subject	 to	 Schmitt’s	 challenge.	 Schmitt	 theorized	 that	 the	emergency	 lies	












Pardy	 critiques	 the	 environmental	 emergency	 argument	 on	 two	 fronts.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 he	
claims	that	the	emergency	argument	is	irrelevant	to	my	primary	concern,	which	is	the	ordinary	
and	 everyday	 exercise	 of	 administrative	 discretion.21	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 he	 dismisses	 the	
environmental	 emergency	 because	 he	 thinks	 it	 obvious	 that	 the	 emergency	 is	 (or	 can	 be)	
governed	 by	 law.22	The	 claims	 need	 to	 be	 unpacked,	 and	 it	 is	 far	 from	 clear	 that	 they	 are	
consistent.	
	
The	 administrative	 state	 is	 a	 central	 concern	 of	 libertarians.	 The	 administrative	 state	 departs	
from	 the	 formal	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 significant	 ways.	 Administrative	 decision-
makers	wield	 significant	policy	and	 lawmaking	powers;	 individual	 rights	are	adjudicated	upon,	
not	 by	 independent	 judges,	 but	 expert	 and	 partial	 tribunal	 members.	 From	 the	 libertarian	




freedom	 of	 contract	 works	well	 for	most	 small-numbered	 transactions	 that	 rest	 on	 a	
stable	distribution	of	property	rights.”23		
The	current	state	of	Canadian	environmental	 law	is	 far	out-of-step	with	this	conception	of	the	
rule	 of	 law.	 Accordingly,	 libertarians,	 such	 as	 Pardy,	 argue	 the	 solution	 is	 to	 eliminate	 the	
administrative	state.24		
	










existing	 legislated	 rules	 cannot	 account	 for	 the	 inevitable	 discretion	 that	 will	 need	 to	 be	




strikes,	 its	 response	 would	 be	 governed	 by	 statute,	 perhaps	 the	 Emergencies	 Act,	 or	
alternatively	by	the	Crown’s	prerogative.	Pardy	writes,		
whether	there	is	a	statute	providing	for	the	power	or	whether	the	Crown	is	exercising	its	




The	 emergency	 perspective	 requires	 that	we	 unpack	 the	 possible	 sources	 of	 authority	 to	 see	
which	can	meet	Schmitt’s	challenge.	
	
Take,	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 the	 Emergencies	 Act.26	The	 Act,	 as	 is	 characteristic	 of	 framework	
emergency	 legislation,	 delegates	 sweeping	 powers	 to	 the	 executive	 to	 act	 in	 times	 of	 crisis.	
Nonetheless,	as	Pardy	rightly	notes,	the	court	possesses	an	interpretive	and	enforcement	power	




emergency	 when	 it	 “believes,	 on	 reasonable	 grounds,”	 that	 an	 emergency	 exists.27	It	 further	
permits	 the	 Governor	 in	 Council	 to	 take	 emergency	 action	 that	 it	 “believes,	 on	 reasonable	
grounds,	 is	necessary.”28	So	long	as	the	Governor	 in	Council	offers	some	reasons	to	support	 its	
belief	that	the	measures	were	necessary,	any	reasons	are	sufficient	to	formally	comply	with	the	










reasons	 for	 its	 decision	 and	 therefore	 do	 not	 effectively	 constrain	 the	 exercise	 of	 executive	
discretion.	
	
This	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law—the	 formal	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law—fails	 Schmitt’s	
challenge.	 It	 fails	 because	 it	 turns	 the	 rule-of-law	 into	 a	 façade,	 or	 a	 thinly	 veiled	 cover,	 for	




legal	 grey	 holes,	 is	 a	 problem.32	But	 he	 does	 not	 articulate	 a	 clear	 basis	 on	which	 the	 courts	
ought	 to	 intervene.	 He	 emphasizes	 the	 role	 of	 precedent	 in	 judicial	 reasoning. 33 	Yet	 a	
commitment	 to	 precedent,	 when	 that	 precedent	 fails	 to	 meaningfully	 constrain	 executive	
discretion,	leaves	the	rule	of	law	hollow.	
	
More	promising	 is	Pardy’s	 suggestion	 that	 the	common	 law	has	 the	potential	 to	constrain	 the	
exercise	of	discretionary	powers.34	Unfortunately,	 Pardy	does	not	elaborate	how	 the	 common	
law	does	or	ought	to	govern	the	exercise	of	emergency	powers	(other	than	to	follow	precedent).	
He	 leaves	 us	 wondering	 why	 judges,	 not	 a	 democratically	 elected	 legislature	 or	 an	 expert	

















Common	 law	 constitutionalism	 posits	 that	 “the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 a	 rule	 of	 fundamental	
constitutional	 principles	 that	 protect	 individuals	 from	 arbitrary	 action	 by	 the	 state.”35	The	
common	 law	 is	a	source	of	 these	fundamental	constitutional	principles,	which	evolve	with	the	
community	as	they	are	tested,	refined	and	redefined	over	time	through	the	process	of	iterative	
common	 law	 reasoning.	 They	 are	 constitutional	 principles	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 compliance	 with	
these	principles	is	constitutive	of	law.	What	counts	as	law—that	is,	which	public	decisions	have	
legal	 authority—is	 determined	 by	 their	 compliance	 with	 these	 core	 common	 law	 principles.	
Public	 officials	 are	 under	 a	 rule-of-law	 obligation	 to	 publicly	 justify	 their	 decisions,	 that	 is	 to	






We	 are	 now	 in	 a	 position	 to	 see	 how	a	 substantive	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 constitutes	
legality	all	 the	way	down:	 from	an	existential	 climate	crisis	 to	a	discretionary	 fisheries	permit.	
Common	law	constitutionalism	meets	Schmitt’s	challenge.	It	provides	an	answer	to	the	question	
of	how	all	exercises	of	political	power—including	emergency	response	powers—can	be	subject	





by	 the	emergency,	 the	ever-present	possibility	of	an	environmental	 catastrophe.	And	 if,	 as	he	






















on	how	 the	 rule	of	 law	 can	be	 realized	 in	Canadian	environmental	 law.	 This	part	 responds	 to	
Pardy’s	assertion	that	a	common	law	constitutional	conception	of	the	rule	of	law	is	a	license	for	
arbitrariness.	It	argues	that	common	law	constitutionalism	gives	rise	to	a	requirement	of	public	
justification.	 This	 requirement	 imposes	meaningful	 obligations	 on	 public	 officials	 that	 protect	





to	 comply	 with	 the	 formal	 features	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law:	 publicly	 announced,	 general,	 clear,	
prospective	and	stable	rules	that	are	enforced	consistently	with	the	stated	rule.38	These	formal	
features	 prevent	 the	 state	 from	 treating	 people	 arbitrarily—using	 them	 as	 means	 to	 ends—
because	it	must	act	through	impersonal,	abstract	and	prospective	rules.39		
	












distributive	 justice.	 …	 No	 one	 expropriates	 a	 squirrel’s	 nuts	 for	 redistribution.	 The	
squirrel	 loses	his	nuts	only	to	 larger	squirrels	who	[sic]	 take	them	by	force.	The	use	of	
state	coercion	to	redistribute	resources	opposes	system	dynamics.	…40		
Pardy’s	aspiration	for	the	rule	of	law	is	to	create	and	maintain	a	survival-of-the-fittest,	winner-
takes-all	 society.	 It	 is	 openly	hostile	 to	notions	of	distributive	 justice,41	dismissive	of	 collective	
reasoning42 	and	 disconnected	 from	 any	 theory	 of	 democracy. 43 	Moreover,	 in	 his	 account,	
environmental	 protection	 is	 only	 assured	 when	 there	 is	 a	 sufficiently	 motivated	 and	 capable	
individual	who	can	defend	 in	court	her	 (property)	 rights	against	 “permanent”	and	“unnatural”	
ecological	interference.44		
	
The	 public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 that	 I	 introduced	 in	 “The	 Environmental	
Emergency”	also	seeks	 to	protect	 individuals	 from	arbitrariness.	But,	unlike	Pardy,	 it	builds	on	
the	republican	notion	of	autonomy	as	non-domination,	or	 the	 idea	that	 individuals	should	not	
be	 subject	 to	 the	 arbitrary	 will	 of	 another.45	The	 rule	 of	 law,	 from	 this	 perspective,	 protects	
individuals	both	from	arbitrary	decisions	and	the	threat	of	arbitrary	decisions.	The	strengths	of	
this	 conception	 of	 autonomy	 have	 been	 articulated	 and	 defended	 elsewhere	 and	will	 not	 be	




Public	decisions	 that	are	not	publicly	 justified	on	 the	basis	of	 core	common	 law	principles	are	
arbitrary.	 Common	 law	 constitutionalism	 guards	 against	 this	 arbitrariness	 by	 imposing	 a	

















reasonableness.	When	 they	 are	 not	 reasoned	 in	 this	 way,	 courts	 and	 other	 reviewing	 bodies	
(such	as	appeals	 tribunals)	have	a	basis	on	which	 to	 intervene.	Publicly	 justified	decisions,	 i.e.	
decisions	 that	 are	 fair	 and	 reasonable,	 protect	 the	 individual’s	 status	 as	 an	 autonomous	 and	
equal	subject	before	the	law.	But	the	process	of	public	justification	also	enables	the	individual	to	
participate	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 law	 because	 it	 provides	 mechanisms	 through	 which	
individuals	 can	 contest	 public	 decisions	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	 do	 not	 in	 fact	 reflect	 core	
constitutional	principles.		
	
The	 public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 inherently	 participatory.	 The	
participation	 of	 the	 individual	 subject	 to	 the	 law	 is	 made	 internal	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 two	




subject.48	The	rule	of	 law,	 in	other	words,	ensures	 the	 legal	 subject	knows	where	he	stands	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 law,	and	 can	plan	his	 life	 accordingly,	but	 it	 also	ensures	 that	he	 is	 entitled	 to	
participate	in	the	project	of	elaborating	the	content	of	the	law	that	he	is	subject	to.	A	system	of	
law	 that	 is	 comprised	 of	 rules	 that	 comply	 with	 the	 formal	 requirements	 of	 law	 (general,	
prospective,	public,	etc)	respects	the	autonomy	of	those	subject	to	the	law.	But	a	system	of	law	
that	includes	an	administrative	state	with	extensive	discretionary	powers	can	also	comply	with	


















The	 public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 goes	 hand-in-hand	 with	 theories	 of	
deliberative	democracy.	Deliberative	democrats	emphasize	the	collective	democratic	project	of	
generating	reasoned	decisions	through	public	deliberation.50		They	argue	that	persuasion	is	“the	




majority	 rule.	 It	 is	 a	process	of	public	decision-making	 that	 strives	 to	 treat	 individuals	as	 free,	
equal	 and	 capable	 of	 giving	 and	 receiving	 reasons	 for	 collective	 action. 53 	The	 rule-of-law	
requirement	 of	 public	 justification	 thus	 fits	 comfortably	 within	 a	 deliberative	 democracy.	 It	
























A	 libertarian	might	 respond,	as	Epstein	does,	by	arguing	 that	public-justification,	while	nice	 in	
theory,	does	not	work	in	practice.	Epstein	writes:	
Discretion	 is,	 to	many	people,	 the	better	part	of	valor.	But	not	 in	public	affairs,	where	
discretion	 leads	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 indefinite	 property	 rights	 that	 invite	 political	







than	others.	But	 these	 failures	are	not	 inevitable	and	“The	Environmental	Emergency”	offered	
examples	of	institutions	endeavouring	to	ensure	public	justification.57	To	be	clear:	nothing	in	the	
public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 undermines	 a	 commitment	 to	 governing	
through	 legislated	 rules	 that	 comply	 with	 the	 formal	 features	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	
environmental	emergency	framework	and	the	public-justification	conception	that	follows	from	
it	 are	 deliberately	 agnostic	 about	 whether	 we	 should	 attempt	 to	 address	 any	 particular	
environmental	 issue	 primarily	 through	 abstract,	 general	 rules	 or	 by	 delegating	 significant	
discretion	 to	 administrative	 decision-makers	 (of	 any	 sort).58	This	 is	 not	 because	 I	 do	 not	 have	



















it	must	offer	 reasoned	 justification	 for	 its	decision	and	that	 the	decision	can	be	challenged	on	
the	basis	that	it	fails	to	show	that	the	decision	has	legal	warrant	consistent	with	constitutional	
principles.	 This	 amounts	 to	 a	 license	 for	 arbitrariness	 only	 if	 one	 adheres	 to	 the	 libertarian’s	
prior	belief	that	state	interference	with	the	private	relations	of	individuals	is	inherently	suspect.	





private	 parties.	 Under	 the	 libertarian’s	 preferred	 conception	 of	 freedom—freedom	 as	 non-
interference—such	 decisions	 may	 arguably	 compromise	 the	 freedom	 of	 the	 individuals	 they	
touch.	 However,	 under	 the	 republican	 conception	 of	 freedom	 that	 underwrites	 the	 public-
justification	conception	of	the	rule	of	law—freedom	as	non-domination—such	decisions	do	not	
compromise	freedom,	precisely	because	their	publicly	justifiable	nature	entails	that	they	are	not	





Parts	 I	 and	 II	 responded	 to	 Pardy’s	 confused	 assessment	 of	 the	 primary	 argument	 in	 “The	
Environmental	Emergency.”	Relying	on	the	emergency	framework,	I	clarified	that	a	common	law	
constitutional	conception	of	the	rule	of	law	can	respond	to	Schmitt’s	challenge	and	thus	provide	
an	account	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	 capable	of	 governing	 the	environment.	 I	 further	 elaborated	 the	
theory	 behind	 common	 law	 constitutionalism,	 how	 it	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 requirement	 of	 public	
justification,	 and	 why	 this	 is	 a	 superior	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 to	 the	 one	 advanced	
elsewhere	 by	 Pardy.	 This	 Part	 turns	 to	 Pardy’s	 direct	 criticisms	 of	 the	 public-justification	
conception	of	the	rule	of	 law.	 In	particular,	 I	 take	up	the	role	of	reasons	 in	environmental	 law																																																									
59	See	generally,	Richardson,	supra	note	45.	
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and	 the	 potential	 for	 creative	 institutional	 design.	 These	 matters	 are	 ripe	 for	 future	
environmental	 law	 scholarship	 that	 seeks	 to	 expand	 upon	 the	 common	 law	 constitutional	
conception	of	the	rule	of	law.		
	




aspirational	 in	 nature.60	The	 fact	 that	 administrative	 decision-makers	 currently	 do	 not	 offer	
public	 reasons	 for	 their	 decisions	 does	 not	mean	 they	 cannot.	When	 they	 fail	 to	 offer	 public	
reasons	that	adequately	justify	their	decisions,	they	fail	to	comply	with	the	rule	of	law.	
	
An	 interesting	 question	 is	 what	might	 “count”	 as	 adequate	 reasons	 in	 light	 of	 the	 variety	 of	
environmental	decisions	that	are	made	in	Canadian	environmental	law.	Important	decisions	are	
often	made	by	way	of	orders	 in	council,	 regulation	or	environmental	permits.	The	 reasons	 for	
the	decision	may	therefore	need	to	take	an	unconventional	form	which	may	further	contribute	
to	 judicial	 reluctance	 to	 engage	 directly	 with	 the	 reasoning	 underpinning	 these	 decisions.61	
While	 I	 cannot	answer	 this	question	 satisfactorily	 in	 the	 scope	of	 this	 reply,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
note	 that	 the	 requirement	 to	offer	 reasons	need	not	 come	 from	 the	 court.62	Indeed,	 in	many	
instances	the	legislature	has	been	the	more	proactive	institution	and	legislated	a	reason-giving	
requirement.	The	federal	Species	at	Risk	Act,	 for	example,	requires	the	Governor	 in	Council	 to	
offer	reasons	when	it	declines	to	protect	a	species	under	the	Act.63	In	some	cases,	the	executive	
might	 implement	 a	 reason-giving	 requirement	 on	 its	 own	 initiative,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 with	 the	














impact	 analysis	prior	 to	proposing	new	 regulations.64	I	 offer	 these	examples	not	because	 they	




Pardy	 notes	 that,	 even	 where	 reasons	 are	 offered,	 administrative	 decision-makers	 are	 not	
subject	to	a	requirement	to	adhere	to	precedent	in	the	same	manner	as	courts.	But	it	is	worth	
asking	why	they	are	not.	Part	of	the	answer	lies	in	persistence	of	the	formal	conception	of	the	
rule	of	 law,	which	 treats	 the	administrative	 state	as	a	 legal	grey	hole.65	In	 contrast,	 subjecting	











As	 I	 noted	 in	 the	 original	 article,	 the	 concepts	 of	 reasonableness	 and	 fairness	 require	 further	
elaboration	in	the	context	of	environmental	law.66	They	will	be	contested	and	sometimes	messy,	
as	they	are	in	other	areas	of	administrative	law.	But	the	process	of	contesting	and	refining	the	
requirements	 of	 reasonableness	 and	 fairness	 in	 any	 given	 case	 is	 precisely	 the	 aim	 of	 a	
democratic	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 persistence	 of	 the	 formal	 conception	 in	











Finally,	 Pardy	 takes	 issue	 with	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 public-justification	 conception	 for	 the	
separation	 of	 powers	 and	 institutional	 design.	 As	 should	 be	 clear,	 Pardy	 and	 I	 fundamentally	
disagree	 about	whether	 we	 ought	 to	 strive	 for	 a	 strict	 separation	 of	 powers	 or	 embrace	 the	
potential	 for	 creative	 institutional	 design	 as	 a	 way	 of	 promoting	 individual	 autonomy	 and	
meaningful	 participation	 in	 environmental	 governance.67 	Understanding	 autonomy	 as	 non-
domination,	as	set	out	in	Part	II,	opens	up	the	possibility	for	institutional	experimentation	that	
can	further	the	project	of	public	justification.	Courts	play	a	central	role	in	maintaining	the	rule	of	
law	 by	 requiring	 that	 other	 institutions	 publicly	 justify	 their	 decisions.	 But	 understanding	 the	






It	 is	worth	noting,	 in	conclusion,	 that	 the	public-justification	conception	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	has	
significant	and	immediate	practical	implications.	The	most	obvious	implication	is	that	it	provides	
a	 legitimate	 basis	 on	 which	 courts	 can	 intervene	 when	 environmental	 decision-makers	 have	
failed	to	justify	their	decisions	in	accordance	with	fundamental	common	law	principles.	To	offer	
one	 example,	 the	 recent	wave	 of	 judicial	 decisions	 that	 have	 legitimized	 the	National	 Energy	
Board’s	flawed	decision-making	process	demonstrates	the	need	to	advance	a	theory	of	law	that	
requires	 reasoned	 environmental	 decisions	 that	 reflect	 core	 common	 law	 principles.70	More	





















Pardy	 and	 I	 share	 three	 common	 premises	 about	 environmental	 law.	We	 both	maintain	 that	
environmental	issues	are	properly	situated	within	the	theory	of	complex,	adaptive	systems.	We	
agree	that	this	understanding	of	ecological	complexity,	in	turn,	presents	a	challenge	for	realizing	
the	 rule	of	 law	 in	 the	environmental	 context.	We	also	agree	 that	 it	 is	nonetheless	possible	 to	
remain	committed	to	environmental	governance	under	the	rule	of	law.	I	argue	that	these	three	
premises	 can	 be	 explored	 by	 understanding	 environmental	 issues	 as	 an	 ongoing	 emergency.	
Pardy	 disagrees.	 However,	 this	 reply	 has	 argued	 that	 Pardy’s	 critiques	 miss	 their	 marks.	 The	
emergency	 perspective	 allows	 us	 to	 unpack	 the	 rule-of-law	 assumptions	 implicit	 in	 the	 deep	
administrative	structures,	if	not	the	current	practice	of	Canadian	environmental	law.	And,	more	
importantly,	 it	 provides	 a	 foundation	 for	 building	 a	 robust	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	
(environmental)	 law,	 one	 that	 requires	 every	 public	 environmental	 decision	 to	 be	 justified	on	
the	basis	of	core	constitutional	principles.	
	
	
																																																								
71	I	am	thinking	here	of	initiatives	like	the	Alberta	Environmental	Monitoring	and	Reporting	Agency,	
criticized	for	its	lack	of	independence	and	legislated	structure	(Shaun	Fluker,	“Protecting	Alberta's	
Environment	Act:	A	Keystone	Kops	Response	to	Environmental	Monitoring	and	Reporting	in	Alberta”	
(2014)	ABLawg,	online:	http://ablawg.ca/2014/01/02/protecting-albertas-environment-act-a-keystone-
kops-response-to-environmental-monitoring-and-reporting-in-alberta/)	and	the	federal	government’s	
Federal	Sustainable	Development	Act,	SC	2008,	c33,	which	authorizes	certain	(weak)	reporting	and	
planning	requirements.	The	exception	to	this	statement	would	be	where	legislation	clearly	and	
unequivocally	limits	or	eliminates	common	law	requirements	of	fairness	and	reasonableness.	
